Showing posts with label Authors Guild. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Authors Guild. Show all posts

Friday, February 11, 2011

The E-Book Royalty Mess, courtesy of Authors' Guild

The E-Book Royalty Mess: An Interim Fix
 
February 11, 2011. To mark the one-year anniversary of the Great Blackout, Amazon's weeklong shut down of e-commerce for nearly all of Macmillan's titles, we're sending out a series of alerts on the state of e-books, authorship, and publishing. The first installment ("How Apple Saved Barnes & Noble. Probably.") discussed the outcome, of that battle, which introduced a modicum of competition into the distribution of e-books. The second, ("E-Book Royalty Math: The House Always Wins") took up the long-simmering e-royalty debate, and showed that publishers generally do significantly better on e-book sales than on hardcover sales, while authors always do worse.
 
Today, we look at the implications of that disparity, and suggest an interim solution to minimize the harm to authors.
 
Negotiating a publishing contract is frequently contentious, but authors have long been able to take comfort in this: once the contract is signed, the interests of the author and the publisher are largely aligned. If the publisher works to maximize its revenues, it will necessarily work to maximize the author's royalties. This is the heart of the traditional bargain, whereby the author licenses the publisher long-term, exclusive book rights in the world's largest book market in exchange for an advance and the promise of diligently working to the joint benefit of author and publisher.
 
Now, for the first time, publishers have strong incentives to work against the author's interests.
 
As we discussed in our last alert, authors and publishers have traditionally acted as equal partners, splitting the net proceeds from book sales. Most sublicenses, for example, provide for a fifty-fifty split of proceeds, and the standard hardcover trade book royalty -- 15% of the retail price -- represented half of the net proceeds from selling the book when the standard was established.* But trade book publishers currently offer e-book royalties at precisely half what the terms of a traditional proceeds-sharing arrangement would dictate -- paying just 25% of net income on e-book sales. That's why the shift from hardcover to e-book sales is a win for publishers, a loss for authors.
 
The Pushback
 
The publisher's standard reply to this -- which we heard yet again after last week's alert -- is a muddle, conflating fixed costs with variable costs. Let's address that before we move on.
 
For any book, a publisher has two types of fixed costs: those attributable to the publisher's operations as a whole (office overhead, investments in infrastructure, etc.) and those attributable to the particular work (author's advance, editing, design). The variable costs for the book are the unit costs of production. These costs (print, paper, binding, returns, royalty) tell a publisher how much more it costs to get, say, 10,000 additional hardcover books to stores and sell them. The publisher's gross profit per unit (unit income minus unit costs) is the amount against which the author's royalties are traditionally and properly measured. With this sort of analysis, a publisher can compare the gross profitability per unit of, for example, a hardcover to a trade paperback edition.
 
Investments in technology change nothing. Publishers never argued, for example, that hardcover royalties needed to be cut when they began equipping their editorial and design staffs with expensive (at the time) personal computers, buying pricey computers and software for their designers, tying those computers together with ever-more-powerful Ethernet cables and routers, and hiring support staff to maintain it all. Publishers simply took their share of the gross profits from book sales and applied it to all of their costs, as they always have. What remains after deducting those costs is deemed the publisher's net profit. Similarly, authors take their share of the proceeds of their book sales and apply it to their overhead (food, clothing, shelter, and computer technology) and costs (their labor and out-of-pocket costs to write the manuscript). What remains is the author's net profit.
 
The proper question is this: how much better off is a publisher if it sells a book, print or digital, than it is if it doesn't? That is what we measured. We then compared that to the author's print and digital royalties per book.
 
Publisher's E-Gains + Author's E-Losses = E-Bias
 
Applying standard trade hardcover and e-book terms to Kathryn Stockett's "The Help," David Baldacci's "Hell's Corner," and Laura Hillenbrand's "Unbroken," we found that publishers do far better by selling e-books than hardcovers (realizing "e-gains" of 27% to 77%), while the authors do much worse (suffering "e-losses" of 17% to 39%). Publishers can't help being influenced by the gains; e-bias will inevitably drive their decisions.
 
Some simplified examples show how e-bias plays out in publishing decisions:
 
1. Promotional Bias. Assume a publisher is contemplating whether to invest a portion of a book's limited marketing budget in stimulating the sale of digital books (paying for featured placement in the Kindle or Nook stores, perhaps) or in encouraging print sales through a promotion at physical bookstores. Either way, the publisher expects the investment to boost sales by 1,000 copies. A sensible publisher would spend the money to promote digital books, pocketing an additional $1,570 to $4,170 on those sales compared to hardcover sales. Such a decision, however, would cost Ms. Stockett, Mr. Baldacci, and Ms. Hillenbrand $1,470, $1,570, and $670, respectively, in royalties.
 
2. Print-Run Bias. E-gains of 27% to 77% become irresistible when a publisher looks at risk-adjusted returns on investment, as any businessperson would. Once a book is typeset for print, the publisher must invest an additional $30,000 to have 10,000 hardcover books ready for sale, using the figures from our prior alert. Once the digital template is created and distributed to the major vendors, on the other hand, there is no additional cost to having the book ready for purchase by an unlimited number of customers. Even the encryption fee (50 cents per book, at most) isn't incurred until the reader purchases the book. In this environment a publisher is nearly certain to keep print runs as short as possible, risking unavailability at bookstores, in order to decrease overall risk and maximize the publisher's return on investment.
 
Publishers, in short, will work to increase e-book sales at the inevitable expense of hardcover sales, tilting more and more purchases toward e-books, and their lower royalties. Publishers, as sensible, profit-maximizing entities, will work against their authors' best interests.
 
An Interim Solution: Negotiate an E-Royalty Floor
 
This won't go on forever. Bargain basement e-royalty rates are largely a result of negotiating indifference. The current industry standards for e-royalties began to gel a decade or so ago, when there was no e-book market to speak of. Authors and agents weren't willing to walk away from publishing contracts over a royalty clause that had little effect on the author's earnings.
 
Once the digital market gets large enough, authors with strong sales records won't put up with this: they'll go where they'll once again be paid as full partners in the exploitation of their creative work. That day is fast approaching, and would probably be here already, were it not for a tripwire in the contracts of thousands of in-print books. That tripwire? If the publisher increases its e-royalty rates for a new book, the e-royalty rates of countless in-print books from that publisher will automatically match the new rate or be subject to renegotiation.
 
So, what's to be done in the meantime? Here's a solution that won't cascade through countless backlist books: soften the e-bias by eliminating the author's e-loss. That is, negotiate for an e-royalty floor tied to the prevailing print book royalty amount.
 
Turning again to our last alert for examples, here are the calculations of e-losses and e-gains without an e-royalty floor:
 
"The Help," by Kathryn Stockett
Author's Standard Royalty: $3.75 hardcover; $2.28 e-book.
Author's E-Loss = -39%
Publisher's Margin: $4.75 hardcover; $6.32 e-book.
Publisher's E-Gain = +33%
 
"Hell's Corner," by David Baldacci
Author's Standard Royalty: $4.20 hardcover; $2.63 e-book.
Author's E-Loss = -37%
Publisher's Margin: $5.80 hardcover; $7.37 e-book.
Publisher's E-Gain = +27%
 
"Unbroken," by Laura Hillenbrand
Author's Standard Royalty: $4.05 hardcover; $3.38 e-book.
Author's E-Loss = -17%
Publisher's Margin: $5.45 hardcover; $9.62 e-book.
Publisher's E-Gain = +77%
 
Here are the calculations with an e-royalty floor:
 
"The Help," by Kathryn Stockett
Author's Adjusted Royalty: $3.75 hardcover; $3.75 e-book.
Author's E-Loss = Zero
Publisher's Margin: $4.75 hardcover; $4.85 e-book.
Publisher's E-Gain = +2%
 
"Hell's Corner," by David Baldacci
Author's Adjusted Royalty: $4.20 hardcover; $4.20 e-book.
Author's E-Loss = Zero
Publisher's Margin: $5.80 hardcover; $5.80 e-book.
Publisher's E-Gain = Zero
 
"Unbroken," by Laura Hillenbrand
Author's Adjusted Royalty: $4.05 hardcover; $4.05 e-book.
Author's E-Loss = Zero
Publisher's Margin: $5.45 hardcover; $8.85 e-book.
Publisher's E-Gain = +62%
 
While this wouldn't restore authors to full partnership status in the sale of their work, it would prevent them from being harmed as publishers try to maximize their revenues. This is only an interim solution, however. In the long run, authors will demand to be restored to full partnership, and someone will give them that status.
 
Part 4 of this series will look at online piracy and book publishing.
 
--------------------------------
 
*A traditional industry rule of thumb was that the price of a hardcover should be five or six times the cost of production. (John P. Dessauer, Book Publishing: What It Is, What It Does. R.R. Bowker 1974, p. 92). To keep the math simple, let's assume that it's priced at five times the cost of production, that there are no returns, and that the bookseller pays the publisher 50% of the list price for the book. Of the 50% the publisher receives, subtract 20% for the cost of production (one-fifth the retail price) and the net proceeds are 30% of the retail list price. Split that in two, and one arrives at the author's standard hardcover royalty, 15% of the retail list price. (A current rule of thumb is that the cost of producing a hardcover is about 15% of the retail price, but the actual costs vary widely.)
 
--------------------------------
Feel free to forward, post, or tweet.  Here is a short URL for linking: http://tiny.cc/0p0jb

Thursday, June 10, 2010

From Authors' Guild for my Bloomberg-Published Friends

The following is quoted in its entirity (with blanket permission)  from an email alert shared with me by Authors' Guild. My membership of Authors' Guild costs me $90.00 a year.

John Wiley & Sons acquired Bloomberg Press, the books division of Bloomberg, in March. At the end of April, it began sending a letter to hundreds of Bloomberg Press authors purporting to inform them "about a few differences in the accounting systems of Bloomberg and Wiley that it will be helpful for you to know about."

While this sounds innocent enough, it isn't. If signed by an author, the letter is actually a contract amendment that will materially and adversely affect the royalty rates of many Bloomberg Press authors.

Among other things, this contract amendment would:

1. Change royalty rates based on retail list price to rates based on net receipts. We've reviewed several Bloomberg Press contracts. All provide for royalty payments based on the retail list price (although we understand that there may be many based on net receipts). The Wiley letter misleadingly presents this to the author as good news: "We are pleased to inform you that we will be paying your royalties on the net amount received..." This change will, for many authors, effectively slice royalties by up to 50% for some book sales. Wiley's letter fails to disclose that.

2. Empower Wiley to keep an author's book in print with a lowball print on demand royalty of 5% of net receipts. (Bloomberg Press had no print on demand program.) The contract amendment, which provides no threshold level of sales for a work to be considered in print, essentially grants Wiley a perpetual right in an author's book for a pittance. The 5% of net receipts royalty rate for print on demand editions is as low as we've seen.

We've asked an independent royalty auditor to review the affects of these contractual changes on royalty income. The royalty auditor found reductions of 24% to 43% using actual sales figures and applying Wiley's amendments. (The precise affect of the amendments will vary by title, depending on particular categories of sales of the work.)

The Authors Guild strongly urges Bloomberg Press authors to not sign this letter without careful consideration. If you have received this letter, consult your agent or a publishing attorney or contact a lawyer in our legal department so you understand precisely how this amendment would affect your rights and royalties. Important: if you have already signed the letter and returned it to Wiley, contact our legal department immediately. Non-Guild members are welcome to contact us as well. All communications will, of course, be held in confidence.

This is no way to do business. The letter is shocking from a publisher of Wiley's stature. In our view, Wiley should tear up any signed letters it has received and start over, forthrightly explaining to its new authors the contractual changes it is seeking and how this may affect their income and their right to terminate their publishing contracts.

-------------
Feel free to forward, post, or tweet.  Here is a short URL for linking: http://tiny.cc/21qg8


I believe that the permission to post, tweet, link etc is something everyone ought  to do. Please spread the word by Tweeting.

Best wishes,

Rowena Cherry


Out of fairness to Wiley, I feel that I ought to add the email from Authors' Guild that come today (Friday June 11th 2010). Again, I quote with Authors' Guild's blanket written permission.

Late yesterday afternoon, John Wiley issued a press release disputing some of the assertions in our alert of yesterday morning. In our alert, we called Wiley's April letter to its Bloomberg Press authors "deceptive" and "misleading" and that it would "materially and adversely affect the royalty rates of many Bloomberg Press authors."

We stand by every word of our alert, and we again call on Wiley to start over. No sensible Bloomberg author with a contract providing royalties based on the retail list price of their book would have signed Wiley's amendment if they were fully aware of its effects. Wiley should send Bloomberg authors a new letter, informing the authors that they are disregarding any previous consents to Wiley's proposed contract changes and clearly explaining how the new terms they're suggesting differ from the authors' existing contracts.

Or, as Scott Turow put it on reviewing their response, "Wiley should knock it off and do the right thing."

In any event, here are our replies to John Wiley's various assertions:

1. Wiley's response says that its April letter to Bloomberg authors "explain[ed] the changes in plain English" and invited authors "to discuss these changes or raise questions."

Wiley's April letter is plain enough, but it avoids any hint that its changes will greatly reduce many Bloomberg authors' royalties. This is fundamental. Wiley's a sophisticated publisher, well aware of what it's doing and well aware that most authors aren't publishing attorneys. It could have spelled out the effects of its proposed contractual changes in equally plain English. If it had done so, then the offer to discuss the changes would have been meaningful.

2. Wiley says that Bloomberg authors' "response to this new alliance has been positive."


This doesn't really respond to our assertions, since it says nothing about the actual letter amendment. To the extent this does refer to the letter amendment to the contract, we note that if one sends a misleading letter, one might successfully get positive responses.

3. Wiley says it "believe[s] former Bloomberg authors will be paid higher royalties in most instances."

The calculation is pretty simple, really. For Bloomberg authors that were paid royalty rates on the basis of retail list price, as is the case for every Bloomberg contract we've reviewed, the author, for example, might receive royalties of 15% of the retail list price on a hardcover priced at $25, or $3.75 per book. If you instead base the royalties on the publisher's net receipts, and the discount to the retailer is a typical 50% off list price, then the author receives 15% of $12.50, or $1.88 per book.

So we're not quite sure where this is coming from, but we note that Wiley doesn't say that it will be paying higher royalty rates, nor does it say that it will pay higher royalty amounts per book sold. It may be assuming that its marketing will be better than Bloomberg's was, so sales will be higher, and the author will benefit, even with reduced royalties per book. That could be, but increased sales are no reason to reduce the contractually agreed royalty rate.

Or, it could be that most Bloomberg authors were already paid on the basis of net receipts, so the effects of the Wiley amendments might be minor. Perhaps there are many such contracts, and perhaps the effects would then be minor. Beats us: we haven't seen an example of a net receipts Bloomberg contract yet.

4. Wiley says that "the limited number of contract amendments the AG apparently chose to select are not therefore representative; nor are their 'calculations' accurate."


While it's true we didn't discuss all of the amendments, things don't look much better if we expand our review. For example, here's one of the amendments we didn't discuss: "For any sales made at a discount of fifty six percent or more, your royalties will be calculated at 7.5% of net receipts and there will be no deductions for manufacturing costs." But the Bloomberg Press contracts we've seen pay authors more than 7.5% of net receipts for those deeply discounted sales. Again, an author who doesn't happen to be a publishing lawyer might not get that. That there will be no deductions for manufacturing costs sounds like a good thing, but the Bloomberg contracts we've seen only deducted those costs for what are essentially remainder sales, books sold at discounts of 75% or more. Royalties on remainders have always been trivial.

We stand by our calculations, which were done using real sales figures by an independent royalty auditor. Wiley can't possibly know if our calculations are inaccurate, since they don't know which books were in our sample.

5. Wiley says we issued our alert "without speaking with Wiley concerning its specific assertions."
Actually, we raised these specific concerns with Wiley in an e-mail on Friday, May 7th:  "[T]hese letters strike us as a deceptive way to make substantial, material changes to a book contract.  We think any signed letters you received in response should be ripped up and this whole thing redone.  When it is redone, we don't think there's any good reason to change the royalty structure or the termination rights of the Bloomberg authors." We then spoke to Wiley.  Wiley told us that the net effect of the changes was complicated and that authors would do better overall.  We weren't persuaded, but we hired a royalty auditor to be doubly sure that we were reading the changes correctly.

Our job, in any event, is to play the role of watchdog. While in this instance we raised our issues with Wiley, we don't believe we're obligated to speak to a publisher when we see egregious behavior before we alert our members.

Do not sign Wiley's misleading letter and send it back to them. First consult us or your agent or your attorney. If you have signed the letter, we urge you to contact us immediately.

Wiley asked us to send you their response. It follows.

Wiley Responds to Authors Guild

Hoboken, NJ, June 10, 2010—Since Wiley acquired the rights to all formerly Bloomberg book titles on March 11, we have been working to provide a wider audience and more sales for these authors. On April 29, Wiley sent letters to the affected authors explaining the changes – in plain English, which we felt would be most helpful and informative for our authors. Wiley invited authors to speak directly with a specific (and named) publishing officer if they wished to discuss these changes or raise questions. Their response to the new alliance has been positive.  

This morning – without speaking with Wiley concerning its specific assertions – the Authors Guild issued an “alert” to its authors, claiming that the Wiley letter is deceptive and inferring that the Wiley changes it effects will reduce royalties for all or most former Bloomberg authors. This is simply not the case. We believe former Bloomberg authors will be paid higher royalties in most instances. The limited number of contract amendments the AG apparently chose to select are not therefore representative; nor are their “calculations” accurate. In any event, Wiley stands by its offer to discuss their individual contracts with all affected authors. We are happy to address any questions and concerns they may have about their individual contracts. Wiley is committed to the Bloomberg authors and is confident we will provide the best possible working relationships for them.

----------
Feel free to forward, post, or tweet.  Here is a short URL for linking: http://tiny.cc/d8txr

Rowena Cherry

Tuesday, December 15, 2009

Authors Guild on Random House (repost)

I occasionally repost info that interests me, and that I think may interest some of my friends and colleagues. Here's the text of an email I just received, which granted blanket permission to repost, retweet, and forward.

The advice about sitting on ebook rights (and not rushing to grant them to Amazon!) interests me, not that I ever had a contract with Random House, because I have retained all my e-book rights with the exception of a license granted to New Concepts Publishing with regard to Mating Net, and an exclusive arrangement I have with Cy Korte of Ebookisle.net for the e-version of Forced Mate.

On Friday, Random House CEO Markus Dohle sent a two-page letter to many literary agents regarding e-books. Much of the letter is devoted to Random House's efforts and investments to market traditional and electronic books.

On the second page, Mr. Dohle gets to the point. After noting that most of Random House's backlist titles grant the publisher electronic book rights (we agree, since most backlist titles are from the past ten years, a period in which authors have generally licensed electronic rights in tandem with their print rights), he writes that "there have been some misunderstandings concerning ebook rights in older backlist titles." He then proceeds to argue that older contracts granting rights to publish "in book form" or "in all editions" grant electronic rights to Random House.

The misunderstandings reside entirely with Random House. Random House quite famously changed its standard contract to include e-book rights in 1994. (We remember it well -- Random House tried to secure these rights for royalties of 5% of net proceeds, a pittance. We called it a "Land Grab on the Electronic Frontier" in our press release headline.) Random House felt the need to change its contract, quite plainly, because its authors did not grant those rights to it under Random House's standard contracts prior to 1994.

A fundamental principle of book contracts is that the grant of rights is limited. Publishers acquire only the rights that they bargain for; authors retain rights they have not expressly granted to publishers. E-book rights, under older book contracts, were retained by the authors.

There's no need to take our word for this, however. A federal court in 2001 examined this precise matter in Random House v. Rosetta Books. Judge Stein of the Southern District of New York was unequivocal in his 10-page decision: authors did not grant publishers the e-book rights in the old book contracts at issue. Judge Stein specifically dismissed notions, raised by Mr. Dohle in his letter to agents, that the non-compete clauses of these old contracts in some manner acted to grant Random House electronic rights to the works, saying that this "reasoning turns the analysis on its head." The court pointed out that the license of rights comes solely from the contract's grant language, not from the non-compete clause, and that non-competition clauses, to be enforceable, have to be narrowly construed. Using the non-compete clause to secure future rights is unsustainable. An appellate court affirmed Judge Stein's decision.

We are sympathetic with the difficult position the publishing industry is in at the moment. The recession has been tough on book publishing, as it has been on many industries. And everyone with knowledge of the dynamics of the industry properly fears that Amazon's dominance of the online markets for traditional and especially e-books will give it a chokehold on industry profits. Difficult times, however, do not justify this attempt at a retroactive rights grab.

It's regrettable and unhelpful that Random House has chosen to try to intimidate authors and agents over these old book contracts. With such a weak legal hand, it would be well advised to stick to its strength -- the advantages that its marketing muscle can provide owners of e-book rights. It should also start offering a fair royalty for those rights. Authors and publishers have traditionally split the proceeds from book sales. Most sublicenses, for example, provide for a 50/50 split of proceeds, and the standard trade book royalty of 15% of the hardcover retail price, back in the days that industry standard was established, represented about 50% of the net proceeds of the sale of the book. We're confident that the current practice of paying 25% of net on e-books will not, in the long run, prevail. Savvy agents are well aware of this. The only reason e-book royalty rates are so low right now is that so little attention has been paid to them: sales were simply too low to scrap over. That's beginning to change.

If you have an old book contract in which you haven't granted e-book rights, patience is likely to pay off. The e-book industry is still young -- there's no need to jump in. And we strongly suspect e-royalty rates are at a low-water mark.

---------
Feel free to forward, post or tweet. Here's a short URL for linking: http://www.tiny.cc/C439s